Comments on: How Iran could thump superior US military https://habitablezone.com/2012/01/26/how-iran-could-thump-superior-us-military/ Fri, 03 Apr 2026 18:20:54 -0700 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: bowser https://habitablezone.com/2012/01/26/how-iran-could-thump-superior-us-military/#comment-11463 bowser Fri, 27 Jan 2012 19:31:30 +0000 http://habitablezone.com/?p=9014#comment-11463 The most effective hunters on the African plains are the wild dogs. When they start after their prey they almost always get it. And that's because they come at it from all sides, take their losses, and keep coming and keep coming. They chew on the legs, sides, back, neck. Sort of like what could happen to a capital ship in a narrow, shallow area. The most effective hunters on the African plains are the wild dogs. When they start after their prey they almost always get it.

And that’s because they come at it from all sides, take their losses, and keep coming and keep coming. They chew on the legs, sides, back, neck.

Sort of like what could happen to a capital ship in a narrow, shallow area.

]]> By: ER https://habitablezone.com/2012/01/26/how-iran-could-thump-superior-us-military/#comment-11458 ER Fri, 27 Jan 2012 17:34:15 +0000 http://habitablezone.com/?p=9014#comment-11458 Modern ships are not equipped to handle threats from low-tech targets. They are designed to fight high-tech opponents by relying on integrated sensor-communications-fire control strategies. They work in fleets, sharing information and fire control with aircraft and other vessels. They fight as a single coordinated organism, not individual independent units. And most Navy ships no longer carry cannon, or are only equipped with small guns, and rarely train to use them against surface targets. It is damn near impossible to hit a speedboat a thousand yards away with a machine gun mounted on deck, much less one 4 miles away at night with a 5 inch autocannon. Small plastic boats do not make good FC radar targets, and in the time it takes an artillery shell to get there, a small boat can move a 100 feet. And no one designs missiles to lock on to fiberglass runabouts. No body brings it up, but when the Vincennes shot down that Iranian airliner, she was simultaneously engaging several Iranian speedboats that were making attacks on her. Although they inflicted no damage, they also got away unscathed. And remember, her computers and fire control systems were specifically designed to handle "multiple independent threats", as the DOD propaganda brochures like to brag. That should tell us something. This was one of the most advanced cruisers in the American Fleet, and she could not only take out a few speedboats, she was so rattled she shot down an airliner by accident. In battle, high technology is of little use when faced with a situation that has not been anticipated and thoroughly drilled for. This is not limited to sea actions, but is particularly important in naval warfare where shipboard effectiveness is a matter of specialist teamwork, teenagers huddled before CRTs, not individual initiative. Ever since the Israeli Destroyer Eilat was sunk by an Egyptian missile during the 1967 war, naval combat is filled with incidents of ships being disabled or destroyed by obsolete weapon systems they were supposedly technically capable of defeating. Think of the Cole, the Starke, and Royal Navy Exocet losses in the Falklands war. Phalanx systems are no panacea, for one thing, they must be secured unless the ship is operating alone, or they will blindly shoot down your own aircraft. Good officers are aware of all this, and take steps to avoid these situations, by using the sea's size and their own speed, plus overlapping multiple sensor and weapon platforms to detect and eliminate threats at great distances. But fighting in the Persian Gulf is like fighting in a shallow crowded lake, where the shore itself is hostile and bristling with radar and weapons. Our advantages are neutralized and we are forced to fight in an environment we never designed or trained for. A lot of things can go wrong that a determined, clever enemy not afraid to die and who also has the element of surprise can exploit. Modern ships are not equipped to handle threats from low-tech targets. They are designed to fight high-tech opponents by relying on integrated sensor-communications-fire control strategies. They work in fleets, sharing information and fire control with aircraft and other vessels. They fight as a single coordinated organism, not individual independent units. And most Navy ships no longer carry cannon, or are only equipped with small guns, and rarely train to use them against surface targets. It is damn near impossible to hit a speedboat a thousand yards away with a machine gun mounted on deck, much less one 4 miles away at night with a 5 inch autocannon. Small plastic boats do not make good FC radar targets, and in the time it takes an artillery shell to get there, a small boat can move a 100 feet. And no one designs missiles to lock on to fiberglass runabouts.

No body brings it up, but when the Vincennes shot down that Iranian airliner, she was simultaneously engaging several Iranian speedboats that were making attacks on her. Although they inflicted no damage, they also got away unscathed. And remember, her computers and fire control systems were specifically designed to handle “multiple independent threats”, as the DOD propaganda brochures like to brag. That should tell us something. This was one of the most advanced cruisers in the American Fleet, and she could not only take out a few speedboats, she was so rattled she shot down an airliner by accident.

In battle, high technology is of little use when faced with a situation that has not been anticipated and thoroughly drilled for. This is not limited to sea actions, but is particularly important in naval warfare where shipboard effectiveness is a matter of specialist teamwork, teenagers huddled before CRTs, not individual initiative.

Ever since the Israeli Destroyer Eilat was sunk by an Egyptian missile during the 1967 war, naval combat is filled with incidents of ships being disabled or destroyed by obsolete weapon systems they were supposedly technically capable of defeating. Think of the Cole, the Starke, and Royal Navy Exocet losses in the Falklands war. Phalanx systems are no panacea, for one thing, they must be secured unless the ship is operating alone, or they will blindly shoot down your own aircraft.

Good officers are aware of all this, and take steps to avoid these situations, by using the sea’s size and their own speed, plus overlapping multiple sensor and weapon platforms to detect and eliminate threats at great distances. But fighting in the Persian Gulf is like fighting in a shallow crowded lake, where the shore itself is hostile and bristling with radar and weapons. Our advantages are neutralized and we are forced to fight in an environment we never designed or trained for. A lot of things can go wrong that a determined, clever enemy not afraid to die and who also has the element of surprise can exploit.

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